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ABSTRACT
Adversarial examples are imperceptible perturbations in the input to a neural model
that result in misclassification. Generating adversarial examples for source code
poses an additional challenge compared to the domains of images and natural lan-
guage, because source code perturbations must adhere to strict semantic guidelines
so the resulting programs retain the functional meaning of the code. We propose a
simple and efficient black-box method for generating state-of-the-art adversarial
examples on models of code. Our method generates untargeted and targeted attacks,
and empirically outperforms competing gradient-based methods with less informa-
tion and less computational effort. We also use adversarial training to construct
a model robust to these attacks; our attack reduces the F1 score of CODE2SEQ by
42%. Adversarial training brings the F1 score on adversarial examples up to 99%
of baseline.
1 INTRODUCTION
Although machine learning has been shown to be effective at a wide variety of tasks across computing,
statistical models are susceptible to adversarial examples. Adversarial examples, first identified
in the continuous domain by Szegedy et al. (2014), are imperceptible perturbations to input that
result in misclassification. Researchers have developed effective techniques for adversarial example
generation in the image domain (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Papernot
et al., 2016a) and in the natural language domain (Alzantot et al., 2018; Belinkov & Bisk, 2018;
Cheng et al., 2020; Ebrahimi et al., 2018; Michel et al., 2019; Papernot et al., 2016b), although work
in the source code domain is less extensive (see Related Work). The development of adversarial
examples for deep learning models has progressed in tandem with the development of methods to
make models which are robust to such adversarial attacks, though much is still being learned about
model robustness (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018; Shafahi et al., 2019; Wong et al.,
2019).
The threat of adversarial examples poses severe risks for ML-based malware defenses (Al-Dujaili
et al., 2018; Grosse et al., 2016; Kaur & Kaur, 2015; Kolosnjaji et al., 2018; Kreuk et al., 2019; Suciu
et al., 2019), and introduces the ability of malicious actors to trick ML-based code-suggestion tools
to suggest bugs to an unknowing developer (Schuster et al., 2020). Generating adversarial examples
for models of code poses a challenge compared to the image and natural language domain, since
the input data is discrete and textual and adversarial perturbations must abide by strict syntactical
rules and semantic requirements. The CODE2SEQ model is a state-of-the-art model of code that has
been used to explore adversarial example design and robustness methods on models of code (Rabin
& Alipour, 2020; Ramakrishnan et al., 2020).
In this work, we propose the Simple TRAined Token Attack (STRATA), a novel and effective method
for generating black-box and white-box adversarial attacks against CODE2SEQ. Our method replaces
local variable names with high impact candidates that are identified by dataset statistics. It can also
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be used effectively for targeted attacks, where the perturbation targets a specific (altered) output
classification. Further, we demonstrate that adversarial training, that is, injecting adversarial examples
into CODE2SEQ’s training set, improves the robustness of CODE2SEQ to adversarial attacks.
We evaluate STRATA on CODE2SEQ, though we hypothesize that the method can be applied to other
models. The principles underlying STRATA apply not only to models of source code, but also to
natural language models in contexts where the vocabulary is large and there is limited training data.
STRATA has a number of advantages compared to previously proposed adversarial attack strategies:
1. STRATA constructs state-of-the-art adversarial examples that outperform gradient-based
methods;
2. STRATA utilizes white-box or black-box adversarial example generation, with black-box
attack performance close to that of the white-box;
3. STRATA does not require the use of a GPU and can be executed more quickly than competing
gradient-based attacks (however, we leave the discussion of this result to the Appendix);
4. STRATA is the only available method (known to the authors at present) which performs
targeted attacks on CODE2SEQ.
2 MOTIVATION
CODE2SEQ, developed by Alon et al. (2019a), is an encoder-decoder model inspired by SEQ2SEQ
(Sutskever et al., 2014); it operates on code rather than natural language. The model is tasked to
predict method names from the source code body of a Java method, using a corpus of approximately
16 million Java methods from top-starred public GitHub repositories for training data. The model
considers both the structure of an input program’s Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs) as well as the
tokens corresponding to identifiers such as variable names, types, and invoked method names. To
reduce the vocabulary size, identifier tokens are split into subtokens by commonly used delimiters
such as camelCase and under_scores. In this example, subtokens would include “camel” and
“case” and “under” and “scores”. CODE2SEQ encodes subtokens into distributed embedding vectors.
These subtoken embedding vectors are trained to capture semantic structure, so nearby embedding
vectors should correspond to semantically similar subtokens (Bengio et al., 2003). In this paper, we
distinguish between subtoken embedding vectors and token embedding vectors. Subtoken embedding
vectors are trained model parameters. Token embedding vectors are computed as a sum of the
embedding vectors of the constituent subtokens. If the token contains more than five subtokens, only
the first five are summed, as per the CODE2SEQ architecture. The full description and architecture of
the CODE2SEQ model is given in the original paper by Alon et al. (2019a).
The CODE2SEQ model only updates a subtoken embedding as frequently as that subtoken appears
during training, which is proportional to its representation in the training dataset. However, the
training datasets have very large vocabularies consisting not only of standard programming language
keywords, but also a huge quantity of neologisms. The frequency at which subtokens appear in
the CODE2SEQ java-large training set varies over many orders of magnitude, with the least common
subtokens appearing fewer than 150 times, and the most common over 108 times.
Thus, subtoken embedding vectors corresponding with infrequently-appearing subtokens will be
modified by the training procedure much less often than common subtokens. Figure 1a demonstrates
this phenomenon, showing a disparity between L2 norms of frequent and infrequently-appearing
subtoken embedding vectors.
We confirm this empirically. When we initialized embedding vectors uniformly at random and
then trained the model as normal, as per Alon et al. (2019a), we found that the vast majority of
final, i.e., post-training, embedding vectors change very little from their initialization value. In fact,
90% of embedding tokens had an L2 distance of less than 0.05 between the initial vector and final,
post-training vector. About 10% of subtokens had a large L2 distance between the initial embedding
and final embedding; these subtokens were more frequent in the training dataset and had embedding
vectors with a notably larger final L2 magnitude (Figure 1).
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(a) The L2 distance between pre- and post-training
embedding vectors for each subtoken, plotted against
the log frequency of subtokens in the training dataset.
(b) L2 norm of trained subtoken embedding vectors.
Dashed and dotted lines chosen arbitrarily to illustrate
tokens which have high L2 norm or frequency.
Figure 1: Visualization of embedding vectors for CODE2SEQ-SM.
The observation that high-L2-norm embedding vectors are associated with subtokens that appear
sufficiently frequently in the dataset motivates the core intuitions of our attack1. We show in this
paper that subtokens with high-L2-norm embedding vectors can be used for effective adversarial
examples, which are constructed as follows:
1. To maximize adversarial effectiveness in a white-box setting, we should use tokens with
high L2 norm embedding vectors as local variable name replacements. We confirm this
empirically in the Experiments section.
2. In the absence of information about the L2 norms of embedding vectors, we can isolate
high-L2-norm subtokens for local variable name replacement by selecting tokens which
appear in the training dataset often enough to be well trained. This is empirically confirmed
by the large intersection of high-L2-norm subtokens and subtokens with high frequency.
3 METHODS
3.1 DATASET DEFINITIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
Alon et al. (2019a) presents three datasets that were used for training different CODE2SEQ models: java-
small (700k examples), java-medium (4M examples), and java-large (16M examples). Unsurprisingly,
CODE2SEQ performs best on java-large (Alon et al., 2019a). We also used these three datasets to train
three different models: we disambiguate the trained CODE2SEQ models from the datasets by denoting
them CODE2SEQ-SM, CODE2SEQ-MD, CODE2SEQ-LG for models trained on java-small, -medium, and
-large, respectively. Many of our experiments are evaluated on all three models; however, experiments
that require adversarial training are only evaluated on CODE2SEQ-SM, for computational feasibility.
3.2 THE ATTACK
Traditional adversarial attacks on discrete spaces involve searching the discrete space for semantically
similar perturbations that yield a misclassification. Searching the space of all possible valid discrete
changes in source code is often intractable or even impossible (Rice, 1953). However, there are
strategies to reduce the search space. For example, perturbations may be limited to a small number of
predefined operations which are known to be semantically equivalent, such as inserting deadcode,
replacing local variable names, or replacing expressions with known equivalent expressions. Gradient-
based attacks on the embedding space may also be used in order to optimize the search of the space
itself (Ramakrishnan et al., 2020; Yefet et al., 2020). Gradient-based attacks rely on knowledge of
the exact parameters of the model.
1We note very-high-frequency subtokens have small L2 norms. Examples of these very-high-frequency
subtokens include: get, set, string, and void, which appear so often as to not be useful for classification.
Despite the fact that these subtokens are not good adversarial candidates for STRATA, there are so few of them
that we expect them to have minimal influence on the effectiveness of our attack.
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We propose STRATA, which replaces local variable names with high-impact subtokens to generate
adversarial examples. STRATA leverages the fact that only a relatively small number of subtoken
embeddings are critical for the classification task performed by the CODE2SEQ model.
In Section 2, we presented two ways to identify high-impact subtokens. STRATA will use these
to replace local variable names. Recall that the model composes these subtokens into tokens by
summing the first five constituent subtoken embedding vectors. We wish to maximize the L2 norm of
the resulting token, while minimizing the semantic change. We propose three strategies:
1. single: pick a single subtoken as the token;
2. 5-diff: pick five different (not necessarily unique) subtokens and concatenate them, which
will have a higher expected L2 norm than single;
3. 5-same: pick a single subtoken, and repeat the subtoken five times to form a token, which
will have the largest expected L2 norm, by the triangle inequality2.
We subjectively propose that single is the smallest semantic change, 5-same is the largest change, and
5-diff represents a medium.
For a given Java method, STRATA generates an untargeted perturbation as follows:
1. Select one random local variable v;
2. Choose an adversarial token v∗ appropriately, using the chosen concatenation strategy
(single, 5-diff, or 5-same). For white-box attacks, choose each subtoken from a high-L2-
norm vocabulary (top-n by L2 norm). For black-box attacks, choose each subtoken with
sufficiently high frequency (top-n by frequency). We discuss the optimal cutoff values (n)
for L2 and frequency in Section 3.5.
3. Replace v with v∗.
Similarly, to perform targeted attacks in which we want the output to include a particular subtoken t,
we perform the same steps as the untargeted attack, and choose v∗ to be a 5-same concatenation of t.
3.3 DATASET-AGNOSTIC BLACK-BOX ATTACKS
The black-box version of STRATA, as proposed, utilizes the subtoken distribution in the training
dataset of the targeted model to determine high-impact subtoken candidates. This technique thus
relies on knowledge of the original dataset, which may not always be known or available. Nonetheless,
STRATA can generate effective adversarial attacks even without the training dataset. Rather, we can
determine subtoken frequency statistics from a different (potentially non-overlapping) Java dataset.
We empirically confirm that STRATA can use non-overlapping datasets (java-small, java-medium,
and java-large) in this way to attack CODE2SEQ models that have been trained on a different dataset.
We conclude that the subtoken distributions of non-overlapping Java datasets are sufficiently similar
for STRATA to be effective. This confirms that STRATA can be applied in a completely black-box
setting without knowledge of the model parameters or training dataset. We leave the results of this
experiment to the appendix.
3.4 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
We perform standard adversarial training in order to make CODE2SEQ most robust to adversarial
attacks. To test the robustness of an adversarially-trained CODE2SEQ model, we perform the following
experiment:
1. We train a CODE2SEQ-SM model.
2. We generate STRATA perturbations of the java-small training dataset using a vocabulary
of the top-1000 subtokens by L2 norm of the embedding. For each training example, we
generate five adversarial perturbations for each concatenation strategy, single, 5-diff, and
5-same.
3. We fine-tune the CODE2SEQ-SM model with the adversarial examples for a final epoch.
2The triangle inequality states that ‖x+ y‖ ≤ ‖x‖+ ‖y‖, and is equal (and thus maximized) when x and y
are colinear, which occurs when x = y. This is easily generalized to five vectors.
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3.5 IMPLEMENTATION
We assayed the effectiveness of the method by applying a simple local variable token replacement
attack. We select a single locally-declared variable at random and rename it with an adversarial token
which does not conflict with another name. Because the initial variable is locally declared, we know
that changing the name will have no effect elsewhere in the program, and will have no behavioral
effect. The token replacement, however, can effectively attack CODE2SEQ; example shown in the
Appendix.
The CODE2SEQ test set consists of ~57,000 examples; we exclude from our testing dataset all methods
that cannot be attacked by our method, i.e. all methods without local variables, leaving ~40,000
examples. We then create several vocabularies of subtokens from which to choose adversarial
substitutions:
1. All: Contains all subtokens. Note that the number of subtokens varies by dataset (Table 1);
2. Top n by L2 norm contains subtokens for which their L2 norm embedding vectors are the n
highest;
3. Top n by frequency contains only the n subtokens which occur in the training data with
highest frequency.
To obtain optimal thresholds of n, we swept the range of possibilities to find the n that minimizes F1
score, i.e., generates the best performing adversarial examples (Figure 2). We present the final values
of n in Table 1.
Dataset Model name Optimal n by frequency Optimal n by L2 Total subtokens
java-small CODE2SEQ-SM 1800 (2.51%) 1000 (1.39%) 71766
java-med CODE2SEQ-MD 3000 (1.65%) 3000 (1.65%) 181125
java-large CODE2SEQ-LG 10000 (5.54%) 6000 (3.33%) 180355
Table 1: The name of the CODE2SEQ model trained on each dataset, along with optimal values of n for
the top-n by frequency and L2 norm vocabularies, and the total number of subtokens for each dataset.
(a) CODE2SEQ-SM (b) CODE2SEQ-MD (c) CODE2SEQ-LG
Figure 2: The F1 scores of the CODE2SEQ models, evaluated on the java-small testing dataset that has
been adversarially perturbed with STRATA for given top-n parameters, using 5-same concatenation.
A lower F1 score corresponds to a more effective attack.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 UNTARGETED ATTACKS
Table 2 compares the three proposed concatenation strategies on each of the three proposed vocab-
ularies. To perform comparisons, we measure the F1 score of the model on the java-small testing
dataset, with each adversarial perturbation. Lower F1 scores correspond with better attacks. We see
that the performance of CODE2SEQ drops when a local variable is replaced with a token composed
of a random selection from all subtokens, using the 5-diff and 5-same concatenation strategies.
However, we observe a larger drop in F1 score when we make variable replacements from subtokens
selected from the top-n subtokens by L2 norm or by frequency, using values of n specified in Table 1.
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When we replaced local variables with random tokens with high L2 norm, the F1 score dropped
substantially, confirming our hypothesis that we can improve the effectiveness of adversarial examples
by selecting replacement tokens such that their subtoken embedding vectors have high L2 norm.
Similarly, adversarial examples that replace a local variable with subtokens of high frequency in the
training dataset are highly effective, suggesting that the black-box method of choosing adversarial
subtokens based on frequency alone can approximate the white-box attack.
Surprisingly, the F1 score of CODE2SEQ-SM increased for random and frequency-based adversarial
perturbations constructed with the single concatenation strategy, suggesting that CODE2SEQ-SM relies
less on variable names for classification than CODE2SEQ-MD or CODE2SEQ-LG.
Baseline All Top-n by L2 norm Top-n by Frequency
single 5-diff 5-same single 5-diff 5-same single 5-diff 5-same
CODE2SEQ-SM .369 .381 .350 .310 .362 .263 .214 .372 .284 .231
CODE2SEQ-MD .564 .548 .531 .492 .513 .416 .375 .513 .385 .345
CODE2SEQ-LG .608 .536 .547 .488 .542 .396 .360 .548 .427 .388
Table 2: Evaluation of F1 scores of STRATA on our CODE2SEQ models, using vocabularies and
replacement strategies as described in the Methods section. The baseline refers to the performance of
the model on the original test dataset. Samples were drawn from the java-small testing set such that
each method included a local variable to perturb. All top-n scores use optimal values of n proposed
in Table 1.
As proposed in Section 3.2, the effectiveness of the adversarial attack is optimized when we replace
local variables with a token that is constructed with the 5-same strategy. Strikingly, the black-box
attack (top-n by frequency) is nearly as effective as the white-box attack (top-n by L2).
4.2 TARGETED ATTACKS
We perform targeted adversarial attacks that aim to inject a chosen subtoken into the output by
performing a STRATA attack using the targeted subtoken for replacement. See the Appendix for an
example.
To assay the effectiveness of targeted attacks, we perform targeted attacks that target three different
subtoken vocabularies: (1) all valid subtokens, (2) the optimized L2 vocabulary, and (3) the opti-
mized frequency vocabulary, where vocabularies are optimized for CODE2SEQ-SM, CODE2SEQ-MD,
or CODE2SEQ-LG appropriately. We determine that a particular attack is successful if the selected
subtoken is included in the output. We measure the percent of successful attacks, thus computing an
aggregate effectiveness of targeted attacks (Table 3).
Model Perturbation Strategy % success
CODE2SEQ-LG L2, top 6k 5-same 37.1
CODE2SEQ-LG Frequency, top 10k 5-same 35.6
CODE2SEQ-LG All 5-same 3.9
CODE2SEQ-MD L2, top 3k 5-same 43.8
CODE2SEQ-MD Frequency, top 3k 5-same 39.1
CODE2SEQ-MD All 5-same 1.4
CODE2SEQ-SM L2, top 1k 5-same 58.7
CODE2SEQ-SM Frequency, top 1.8k 5-same 52.8
CODE2SEQ-SM All 5-same 2.1
Table 3: Effectiveness of targeted attacks on CODE2SEQ.
Table 3 reveals that CODE2SEQ is especially vulnerable to targeted attacks performed on high-impact
subtokens. The black-box (frequency) attack performs similarly to the white-box (L2) attack.
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4.3 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Baseline single 5-diff 5-same
Clean-Tr .369 .362 .263 .214
Adv-Tr .371 .382 .370 .366
Table 4: Results of adversarial training of CODE2SEQ-SM on L2-based adversarial examples.
Adversarial training significantly improves robustness to the STRATA (Table 4). Unexpectedly,
training with adversarial examples slightly improves the ability of the model to classify clean data
(improvement from F1 of 0.369 to 0.371), suggesting that the added robustness forces the model
to learn a better representation of the source code. This adversarial fine-tuning was not more
computationally intensive than standard training and represents a simple way to make this model of
code more robust.
4.4 TRANSFERABILITY
In this section we show that gradient-based adversarial training as proposed by Ramakrishnan et al.
(2020) is not effective at improving robustness to STRATA attacks. We test a CODE2SEQ model that has
been trained to be robust to the gradient-based adversarial examples proposed by Ramakrishnan et al.
(2020), and find that the model is indeed robust to the gradient-based token-replacement perturbations.
However, neither the original nor the robust model are impervious to perturbations produced by
STRATA (Table 5). This result confirms that STRATA can effectively target models that are robust to
some gradient-based perturbations; therefore it is a useful tool when hardening models of code, even
when gradient-based perturbations are also being used.
Model No perturbations (F1) Gradient perturbations (F1) STRATA perturbations (F1)
Original .363 .243 .212
Robust .367 .342 .240
Table 5: F1 scores of a non-robust and robust CODE2SEQ-SM model on gradient-based adversarial
perturbations and STRATA perturbations.
5 STRATA OUTPERFORMS SIMILAR ATTACKS
At the time of writing there are two other works that address adversarial attacks targeting CODE2SEQ:
a class of source code transformations by Rabin & Alipour (2020) and gradient-based attacks by
Ramakrishnan et al. (2020). We greatly outperform the transformations considered in Rabin &
Alipour (2020). These results are presented in the Appendix.
We compare our work to gradient-based adversarial perturbations proposed by Ramakrishnan et al.
(2020). We consider the variable replacement, print statement insertion, try-catch statement insertion,
and worst-case single transformation attacks for our comparison. We find that STRATA outperforms
all attacks performed by Ramakrishnan et al. (2020), including greatly outperforming the gradient-
based local variable replacement attack and performing similarly to the worst-case transformation,
despite the fact that STRATA generates smaller perturbations with less computational effort, and
with less information about the model (Table 6). These results indicate that STRATA attacks are
state-of-the-art on CODE2SEQ.
6 RELATED WORK
Adversarial examples for models of code Allamanis et al. (2018) provide a comprehensive survey
of prior research on models of code. Several papers develop techniques for generating adversarial
examples on models of source code: Quiring et al. (2019) perform adversarial attacks on source
code by applying a Monte-Carlo tree search over possible transformations, and Zhang et al. (2020)
7
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Adversarial attack F1 % of baseline score
Baseline (Ramakrishnan et al.) .414 100
Variable Replacement (Ramakrishnan et al.) .389 93.9
Try-catch Statement Insertion (Ramakrishnan et al.) .336 81.2
Print Statement Insertion (Ramakrishnan et al.) .312 75.3
Worst-case Transformation (Ramakrishnan et al.) .246 59.4
Baseline (STRATA) .369 100
Top 1k by L2 (STRATA) .214 58.0
Top 1.8k by frequency (STRATA) .231 62.6
Table 6: Comparison of F1 scores our method to gradient-based attacks described by Ramakrishnan
et al. (2020). Both our model and the Ramakrishnan et al. (2020) model are trained on java-small.
We perform 5-same attacks.
apply Metropolis-Hastings sampling to perform identifier replacement to create adversarial examples.
Bielik & Vechev (2020) improve on the adversarial robustness of models of code by developing a
model that can learn to abstain if uncertain.
Adversarial examples for CODE2VEC and CODE2SEQ Yefet et al. (2020) generate both gradient-
based targeted and untargeted adversarial examples for CODE2VEC Alon et al. (2019b). Most directly
related to our paper, Ramakrishnan et al. (2020) perform gradient-based adversarial attacks and
adversarial training on CODE2SEQ. Rabin & Alipour (2020) evaluate the robustness of CODE2SEQ to
semantic-preserving transformations.
Targeted attacks on models of code As previously noted, Yefet et al. (2020) propose a method
for targeted adversarial examples for CODE2VEC (Alon et al., 2019b). To our knowledge, at the time
of writing, no other paper performs targeted attacks on CODE2SEQ.
Adversarial training for robustness Many recent papers have examined the robustness of neural
network models to adversarial perturbations. Szegedy et al. (2014) demonstrates that neural networks
are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, but that training on these perturbations, i.e., adversarial
training, can increase robustness. Further papers explore faster and more effective methods of
adversarial training to improve robustness, though mostly in the continuous domain (Madry et al.,
2018; Shafahi et al., 2019; Wong et al., 2019). Ramakrishnan et al. (2020) perform adversarial
training on CODE2SEQ to improve robustness. Yefet et al. (2020) propose multiple methods to improve
robustness of models of source code, including adversarial training, outlier detection, and excluding
variable names from model input.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented STRATA, a simple method for generating adversarial examples in discrete
space that can be used to help build robustness in models of code. Because the L2 norm of an
embedding vector can be approximated by the frequency in the training data, STRATA can be used
to generate both white- and black-box attacks. We presented effective attacks using this method,
including targeted attacks, and also showed that adversarial fine-tuning using STRATA examples can
lead to increased robustness, even when the fine-tuned model is only being tested on clean data.
Our work does have some limitations. In the continuous domain, many adversarial attacks may not
even be detected by humans; in the discrete domain, this is not possible, but some attacks in the
discrete space are more realistic (harder to spot) than others. The most powerful attack we propose,
5-same, is also the least realistic; single is a smaller perturbation but it has less effective attacks.
An exciting area of future inquiry would be the application of this attack to other models, including
natural language models. The magnitude differences in subtoken frequency in code is similar to the
magnitude differences in word frequency in natural language (Piantadosi, 2014). In fact, tokens in
software follow the same distribution as words in natural language (Zhang, 2008). We theorize that
8
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STRATA could be used to good effect in models of natural language as well as models of code, and
that the basic intuitions underlying the attack can extend even to domains where the actual training
data is not available, as long as a suitably similar dataset is available.
To summarize, STRATA is a high-impact, low-cost attack strategy that can be used to bolster
robustness; we have made its code open-source so that those who wish to use it may do so.
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A FULL COMPARISON WITH OTHER CODE2SEQ ATTACKS
We have shown that STRATA works well to attack the CODE2SEQ model and can outperform the
attacks by Ramakrishnan et al. (2020). Here, we present a comparison by the transformations
proposed by Rabin & Alipour (2020). In order to be able to compare the same metrics, we calculate
the percent prediction change, which is the percent of the time that an adversarial change resulted in
a change in prediction. A higher percent prediction change indicates a better attack.
In Table 7, we compare the performance of our attack to the performance of the transformations
generated by Rabin & Alipour (2020) We find that the transformations performed by Rabin & Alipour
(2020) result in fewer prediction changes than STRATA. As above, the most effective strategy is our
5-same attack.
Adversarial attack % prediction change
Variable renaming (Rabin et al.) 47.04
Boolean Exchange (Rabin et al.) 51.43
Loop Exchange (Rabin et al.) 42.51
Permute Statement (Rabin et al.) 43.53
All (STRATA, 5-same) 77.3
Top 6k by L2 (STRATA, 5-same) 86.3
Top 10k by Frequency (STRATA, 5-same) 84.5
Table 7: Comparison of the percent of the time the prediction is changed by STRATA and by an
attack from Rabin et al. Both our attack and the attack from Rabin et al. target a CODE2SEQ-LG. Note
that our model is evaluated on the java-small testing dataset.
B CROSS-DATASET ATTACKS
We present two fully black-box attacks that do not require any information about the targeted
CODE2SEQ model or dataset:
As a surrogate model, we train a CODE2SEQ model on any available dataset for the targeted pro-
gramming language. To obtain adversarial examples from the surrogate, we identify optimal L2 and
frequency cutoffs for this model. Using these cutoffs, we construct a vocabulary of the optimal top-n
by frequency or by L2 norm. We show that these adversarial examples can be transferred to other
models.
We present the results of the cross-dataset transfer attack proposed in Section 3.3. In particular,
we generate both frequency and L2 STRATA adversarial examples. We use the L2 norm of the
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Figure 3: Changing local variable identifiers affects prediction. Left: Original Java method
computeProduct computes the product of a list of integers. CODE2SEQ, trained on java-large, pre-
dicts that the method name is product. Right: Perturbed Java method with the same behavior, but
the local variable product has been replaced with identify, causing CODE2SEQ to misclassify
this method as getIdentify.
embeddings of CODE2SEQ-SM, CODE2SEQ-MD, and CODE2SEQ-LG, and the subtoken frequencies of
java-small, java-medium, and java-large to construct six different collections of adversarial examples,
of which each collection is a perturbation of the java-small test set. We test each dataset on each
model. Tables 8 and 9 show the results of the experiments, revealing that while the white-box
and known-dataset attacks (the diagonals of the tables) outperform the cross-dataset attacks, the
cross-dataset attacks are nonetheless effective. Furthermore, we note that L2-based cross-dataset
attacks are more effective than frequency-based cross-dataset attacks, confirming that L2 norms can
effectively identify subtokens that are high impact in other models. We conclude that STRATA can
be performed in a true black-box setting with no information about the model parameters nor the
training dataset. The cross-dataset attack is likely effective due to similar distributions of the Java
datasets. Similar to word frequencies in natural language corpora, we expect that most Java datasets
should have a similar subtoken distributions, and thus STRATA should transfer across models trained
on different datasets.
java-small (1k, L2) java-medium (3k, L2) java-large (6k, L2)
CODE2SEQ-SM .214 .253 .290
CODE2SEQ-MD .359 .349 .433
CODE2SEQ-LG .373 .361 .358
Table 8: F1 scores on adversarial data generated by a cross-dataset attack where vocabularies are
constructed by using the L2 norm of the embeddings of the CODE2SEQ model trained on the particular
dataset. The first column corresponds with the model that is being attacked, and the other columns
correspond with the dataset from which the attack is constructed. Lower score means a better attack.
All adversarial subtokens are concatenated with 5-same. The boxed scores correspond with the
baseline same-dataset attacks.
java-small (1.8k, freq) java-medium (3k, freq) java-large (10k, freq)
CODE2SEQ-SM .235 .248 .279
CODE2SEQ-MD .381 .377 .417
CODE2SEQ-LG .397 .392 .387
Table 9: F1 scores on adversarial data generated by a cross-dataset attack where vocabularies are
constructed by using the frequency of subtokens in the associated training dataset. The first column
corresponds with the model that is being attacked, and the other columns correspond with the dataset
from which the attack is constructed. Lower score means a better attack. All adversarial subtokens
are concatenated with 5-same. The boxed scores correspond with the baseline same-dataset attacks.
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C EXAMPLES OF TARGETED ATTACKS
To illustrate the effectiveness of STRATA targeted attacks more concretely, we target particular
arbitrarily-picked subtokens and measure the success rate over the entire testing set (Table 10) and
find that though effectiveness can vary across different targets, the average effectiveness is quite high.
We present an example of an attack targeting the token identify in Figure 3.
Target % Target % Target % Target %
tournament 86.3 ftp 53.4 concat 41.5 combat 26.6
redaction 70.5 podam 45.3 eternal 37.3 thursday 23.9
outliers 62.4 wind 44.7 orderby 32.8 girth 21.5
mission 56.8 weld 42.4 reentry 29.8 ixor 16.4
Table 10: Effectiveness of targeted attacks on CODE2SEQ-LG using uncurated and arbitrarily picked
subtokens of high embedding vector, sorted by % success.
C.1 COMPUTATIONALLY INEXPENSIVE
Current alternative methods for attacking models of source code with comparable results involve
either an extensive search for optimal transformations or gradient-based optimization for token
replacement, or a combination of the two (Rabin & Alipour, 2020; Ramakrishnan et al., 2020; Yefet
et al., 2020). Extensive searches are inherently computationally expensive and, in the case of gradient-
based optimization, oftentimes require a GPU for efficient implementation. STRATA, however, can be
implemented to run quickly on even CPU-only machines. After an initial pre-processing step to mark
local variable names for easy replacement which took less than five minutes on our 24-core CPU-only
machine, we were able to construct adversarial examples using STRATA on a dataset of 20,000
within seconds. The analogous gradient-based method proposed by Ramakrishnan et al. (2020)
took multiple hours on the same machine. The combined speed and effectiveness of STRATA will
allow researchers to quickly harden their models against adversarial attacks with efficient large-scale
adversarial training.
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